CHAPTER I. — THE GREAT RETREAT
MONS—CAMBRAI—LE CATEAU
THE FIRST DESPATCH
(From Field-Marshal Sir John French)
RECEIVED by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field—
September 7, 1914.
MY LORD,
I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch.
The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination in this country well within the scheduled time.
The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign.*
[* It will be remembered that Sir John French visited the French War Office in Paris before leaving for the front to take command of the British Expeditionary Force.]
The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows—
From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the 2nd Corps, and to the right of the 2nd Corps from Mons the 1st Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
In the absence of my 3rd Army Corps,* I desired to keep the Cavalry Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.
[* One division (20,000 men) of the 3rd Corps came over in time to play a very worthy part in the fight at Le Cateau later. They got out of the train and went straight into battle, a fact which General French emphasizes later.]
During August 22nd and 23rd these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.
At 6 a.m. on August 23 I assembled the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the position, and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.
From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my position;* and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observation of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.
[* About this time the information as to German movements were very vague.
We knew that they were massing on the