FOREWORD

This book is overdue by almost two hundred years.

Major Richard Llewellyn, who fought at the battle of Les Quatre Bras, wrote in 1837: ‘Had it not been so closely followed by the very decisive and important, but all-absorbing victory of Waterloo, perhaps the gallant exploits and unexampled bravery that marked that day would have, under other circumstances, excited even more admiration than was actually associated with it.’

My interest in the Waterloo campaign was awakened by a Christmas gift from my parents of Carmigniani’s beautiful conception of Lachouque’s ‘Waterloo’, but like many others, I was beguiled by the climactic nature and iconic status that the final battle of the campaign has received. Some eight years ago, a change in circumstance made it possible for me to consider making my own contribution on the subject and it was only after many months of reflection and a moment of inspiration from Philip Haythornthwaite that I heard Llewellyn’s voice across time and the germ of an idea started forming in my mind.

History is littered with books on virtually every aspect of the campaign: one can read about grand strategy; weapons; personal experiences and even the weather. But what I discovered was that, despite this immense body of literature, only one book had ever been written that focused solely on the battle of Les Quatre Bras, by a little-known Dutch author named J. P. Jonxis in 1875. Though Alain Arcq has subsequently published his own treatment of the battle in French, there remains no English language work on the subject.

Why has the battle attracted so little attention from historians? At a strategic level, Les Quatre Bras resulted in Napoleon failing in his objective of separating the Allied armies and defeating them in detail; on 16 June 1815 he lost and never recovered the initiative. Despite earlier miscalculations, Wellington gained sufficient time to rectify his mistakes and concentrate his army, but only at the cost of some 5,000 casualties. Though the Prussians were defeated at Ligny on the same day, a French defeat at Waterloo was made infinitely more probable and the two battles can rightly be considered a turning point in the campaign. But whilst this book provides insights into the thinking of those in command, it does not seek to evaluate the performance of the generals, nor offer opinions on strategic or tactical matters.

Les Quatre Bras was a confusing battle in many respects and this has led to many discussions between historians, differences of opinion and not a little controversy. Little is known of the sequence of events; long periods of time and large areas of the fighting remain shrouded in mystery; the commanders committed errors of omission and commission; and the soldiers as ever, were inconsistent, with supposedly élite units behaving poorly and the most unlikely formations performing prodigious feats of valour. These characteristics have not been helped by a degree of historical partiality which would have the English language reader believe that the victory was won by Wellington’s redcoats alone, that the German contingents played a negligible role and that the Netherlands troops, to paraphrase Ensign Edward Macready of the 30th Regiment of Foot, ‘Behaved vilely’. I have found the reality to be somewhat different.

Finally, I was struck by the drama of the events and the impact that the experience had on those who took part. From the time at which the French invaded in the early hours of 15 June 1815, until the last musket shot was fired at Les Quatre Bras on the evening of the following day, events in southern Belgium escalated to a dramatic conclusion, with anxious Allied generals obliged to disregard orders based on incomplete or faulty intelligence and use their ini