The two Libyan suspects were formally indicted in November 1991 and, along with being a necessary legal procedure whereby the accused and the charges are publicly narrated, it also had the additional benefit of increasing international pressure on Libya.
Requests for extradition were made to Libya for the two suspects at the outset. Understandably, given the relationship between the countries, no formal treaty existed between Libya and either the UK or the US, and therefore no formal, internationally agreed routes could be invoked. Requests were made to the Libyan authorities to have the accused simply handed over for trial, despite the lack of formal legal mechanisms, but they were refused by the North Africans. An offer, though, was made in turn by the Libyans to detain them for trial in their home country if evidence was provided. That in turn was rejected by the UK and the US, neither of whom were prepared to hand over their hard-gathered and highly technical evidence, nor trust a trial on Libyan soil. An impasse remained and so it was to remain for several more years.
During this time, the pressure continued to mount. Sanctions had been taken against Libya by the United Nations and other states since the 1970s, and these were augmented by a further UN declaration in 1992 as a result of the Lockerbie allegations. These additional sanctions widened in terms of scope, bringing in many more countries, as well as heightening the level of compliance. This wasn’t, after all, a case of allegations of subterfuge or links through weapons and bombs to others that they could just simply deny. Now there were two real individuals accused of a mass atrocity, with names and faces that had been shown around the world. Libya’s friends and allies were reducing as the world opprobrium towards them increased, and more and more, neighbouring North African nations began to feel the heat. Even Colonel Gaddafi could see that some resolution was needed. But, given the make-up of the Libyan regime, he couldn’t simply bow down and throw two of his citizens, wider clan and, indeed, security officials to the waiting western wolves. There were both tribal ties and political necessity to be overcome if he were to broker the deal his country needed, but he was willing to parley.
The will and resolve of Gaddafi and his Libyan colleagues were being sorely tested through the sanctions policy. It wasn’t simply trade boycotts but the daily life of ordinary citizens that was being affected. Travel to Libya was difficult. Medical supplies in hospitals were restricted, causing problems for the sick and vulnerable. The maintenance of machinery and vehicles were all suffering as repairs could not be made due to the limited supply or unavailability of parts. The price of oil had been falling and the Libyan economy was reeling. Once inured to a great deal through oil wealth, the costs were now being felt in their society. The changing international world also impacted on them. The collapse of the Soviet Union played a part. Soviet support had made access to military hardware and other support accessible and often available at a discount price. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union made much of that no longer available or affordable. In addition, the world, though still turbulent, now comprised of one, not two, superpowers; and the one left standing was the US. The noose was contracting and a deal was needed. But, it was not one that could be done at any price –
