This book repairs and revives theTheory of Knowledge research program of Russell'sPrincipia /i> era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program's agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism ofPrincipia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic apriori logic ofPrincipiais the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient inThe Problems of Philosophy, the program's acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particularlogical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, Scientific Method in Philosophy became the sequel toProblems. Chapter 2 explains Russell's feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein's demand thatlogic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4-6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts aboutPrincipia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains auniversal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.
Gregory Landini is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa, USA. His research interests include philosophy of logic, metaphysics, modal logic, foundations of mathematics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and the history of early analytic philosophy. His books include: Frege's Notations: What They Are and How They Mean (2012),Russell(2010),< >Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell( 007) andRussell's Hidden Substitutional Theory (1998). |
