: Michael Negri
: Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football. An Analysis of existing Problems and the Development of Solution Strategies with particular Regard to the Princi
: Diplomica Verlag GmbH
: 9783842802247
: 1
: CHF 40.10
:
: Angewandte Psychologie
: English
: 136
: kein Kopierschutz/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
Making people act the way oneself wishes is a challenging task in private and professional life. Scientific literature proposes two basic approaches to make people comply with one´s interests in this context. One way is to foster the persons´ intrinsic motivation or to offer extrinsic rewards. The other method is to punish misbehaviour by removing something pleasant or presenting something aversive to a person. Regardless which approach is chosen, the measures taken have to be oriented towards the persons’ characters and the existing circumstances to be effective.
This work answers the question of how problems resulting from a constellation in which someone acts on behalf of another person can be reduced or even solved. This type of interaction between two parties is referred to as ´Principal-Agent Theory´ in literature and represents the theoretical basis of the work.
As a practical example, the case of football referees in the district of Guetersloh, Germany, is consulted. In order to back up the findings from the Principal-Agent Theory, an empirical analysis delivers further solution mechanisms. Basing on this case, the author shows which motivational aspects influence human behaviour and provides practical recommendations to make people act in accordance with one’s own interests. In this regard, the role of punishment is also evaluated and it is shown how this form of negative enforcement has to be set up to be effective.
The work therefore offers guidance and tools for people who have to manage others and helps to understand why people act the way they do.
Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football1
Table of Contents3
1 Introduction5
2 Problem and Methodology7
2.1 Problem Definition and Relevance7
2.2 Research Methods9
3 Key Terms: Punishment and Motivation10
3.1 Motivation10
3.2 Punishment11
4 Theoretical Background11
4.1 The Principal-Agent Theory12
4.2 The Deterrence Hypothesis17
4.3 Motivation and Punishment in Scientific Literature21
5 Referees in non-professional football – The District of Guetersloh25
5.1 Facts and Figures25
5.2 Organization29
5.2.1 Structures29
5.2.2 The Referee Constitution30
5.2.3 Recruitment Process30
5.2.4 Monthly Meetings and Annual Test32
5.2.5 Referee Assignment Process33
5.2.6 Remuneration34
5.2.7 Promotion/Relegation36
5.3 Display of the Problems38
5.4 Hypotheses39
5.4.1 Motivational Issues39
5.4.2 Punishment/Fines39
5.5 The Questionnaire Study40
5.6 Results from the Questionnaire Study42
5.6.1 Motivation42
5.6.2 Monthly Meeting43
5.6.3 Annual Test44
5.6.4 Punishment and Fines45
5.6.5 Coaching46
5.6.6 Bribery / Game Manipulation46
6 Case Solution47
6.1 Missing Quantity of Referees47
6.2 Missing Quality of Referee Aspirants49
6.3 Unreliability of active Referees53
6.4 Bribery and Game Manipulation61
6.5 Motivation62
6.5.1 Application of the Needs Hierarchy63
6.5.2 Application of the Expectancy Theory65
6.6 The Effectiveness of Punishment68
6.6.1 Application of the Deterrence Hypothesis68
6.6.2 Empirical Evidence76
7 Critical Valuation77
7.1 Assessment of the applied Theories77
7.1.1 The Principal-Agent Theory77
7.1.2 The Needs Hierarchy79
7.1.3 The Expectancy Theory79
7.1.4 The Deterrence Hypothesis81
7.2 Assessment of the Empirical Study83
8 Conclusion and Outlook84
Bibliography86
Appendix91
List of Abbreviations134
List of Figures135