| Preface | 7 |
---|
| Contents | 9 |
---|
| Acronyms | 13 |
---|
| Chapter 1 Introduction | 17 |
---|
| 1.1 Motivation and Research Question | 17 |
| 1.2 Analytical Approach | 18 |
| 1.3 Main Contribution | 19 |
| 1.4 Outline | 21 |
| Part I Theoretical Analysis | 23 |
---|
| Chapter 2 Foundations of the Theoretical Analysis | 24 |
| 2.1 Social versus Private Time Preferences | 24 |
| 2.1.1 The Economic Discounting Debate: First-best Benchmark, Second-best Cases, and Some More Recent Issues | 25 |
| 2.1.2 Three Reasons Particularly Relevant for the Present Analysis | 31 |
| 2.1.3 Summary and Treatment of the Assumption in the Model | 42 |
| 2.2 Time-Lagged Capital Theory | 44 |
| 2.2.1 Its Evolution and the Basic Neo-Austrian Three-process Model | 45 |
| 2.2.2 New Extensions | 47 |
| 2.3 Analytical Structure of the Model in Chapter 3 | 47 |
| 2.4 Conclusion | 48 |
| Chapter 3 A Theoretical Model of Structural Change in the Energy Industry | 49 |
| 3.1 Model | 49 |
| 3.2 Social Optimum | 52 |
| 3.2.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Social Optimum | 52 |
| 3.2.2 Conditions for Investment and Replacement | 55 |
| 3.3 Unregulated Competitive Market Equilibrium | 59 |
| 3.3.1 The Household s Market Decisions | 59 |
| 3.3.2 The Firms Market Decisions | 60 |
| 3.3.3 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Unregulated Market Equilibrium | 61 |
| 3.3.4 Conditions for Investment and Replacement | 62 |
| 3.4 Competitive Market Equilibrium with Emission Tax and Investment Subsidy | 65 |
| 3.4.1 The Household s and Firms Market Decisions under Regulation | 65 |
| 3.4.2 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Regulated Market Equilibrium | 66 |
| 3.4.3 Conditions for Investment and Replacement | 68 |
| 3.5 Conclusion | 72 |
| Chapter 4 Summary of Results, Discussion of Assumptions, and Policy Implications | 73 |
| 4.1 Summary of Results | 73 |
| 4.1.1 Too Low Unit Costs of Energy of Established Technology as Compared to Social Optimum Due to Pollution | 73 |
| 4.1.2 Too High Unit Costs of Energy of New Technology as Compared to Social Optimum Because Private Time-Preference Rate Higher Than Socially Optimal | 74 |
| 4.1.3 Time Lag of Capital Accumulation Reinforces Distortion from Split of Social and Private Time-Preference Rates | 75 |
| 4.1.4 Distortions Imply in Mutually Reinforcing Way Less Favorable Circumstances for Innovation and Replacement | 75 |
| 4.1.5 Social Optimum May Be Implemented by Setting Appropriate Emission Tax and Investment Subsidy | 76 |
| 4.1.6 Environmental Policy Alone Biased Towards Gradual Change, Technology Policy Alone Independant of Environmental Effect | 76 |
| 4.2 Discussion of Model Assumptions | 77 |
| 4.2.1 Social Rate of Time Preference Below Private | 77 |
| 4.2.2 Time Lag in Capital Accumulation | 77 |
| 4.2.3 Focus on Linear-limitational, General Energy Technologies | 78 |
| 4.2.4 Labor Only Primary Input, Energy Homogeneous Output | 78 |
| 4.2.5 Emissions as Flow Pollutant | 79 |
| 4.2.6 Abstraction from Peculiarities of Economics of Power Systems | 79 |
| 4.3 Policy Implications | 79 |
| 4.3.1 New Reason for Technology Policy | 80 |
| 4.3.2 No Support of Subsidies for Specific Technologies | 80 |
| 4.3.3 Necessary Completion of Environmental by Technology Policy | 80 |
| 4.3.4 Environmental Policy Alone Favors Gradual Change | 81 |
| 4.3.5 Substantiation of Win-win Hypothesis of Environmental Regulation | 81 |
| 4.4 Conclusions to Theoretical Part | 81 |
| Part II Applied Analysis | 83 |
---|
| Chapter 5 Foundations of the Applied Analysis | 84 |
| 5.1 Analytical Setting and Specifics of the Applied Investigation | 84 |
| 5.1.1 Analytical Setting | 85 |
| 5.1.2 Focus on Germany Around 2015 and Conventional Generation Technologies | 86 |
| 5.1.3 Previous Literature, Contribution, and Data Sources | 87 |
| 5.1.4 Relationship to Theoretical Part | 90 |
| 5.2 Financial Model | 91 |
| 5.2.1 Capital Costs | 91 |
| 5.2.2 Costs During Operation | 93 |
| 5.2.
|