: Christoph Heinzel
: Distorted Time Preferences and Structural Change in the Energy Industry A Theoretical and Applied Environmental-Economic Analysis
: Physica-Verlag
: 9783790821833
: 1
: CHF 87.20
:
: Volkswirtschaft
: English
: 166
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
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The present study is a slightly revised version of my PhD thesis which was accepted at the Economics Department of Dresden University of Technology in July 2008. It has a long and a short history. For it began, as suggested theme, as a fundamental evaluation of evolutionary economics for ecological economics, asking, especially, for what the two ?elds actually constitutes and, eventually, relates. In several years of unfruitful dwelling, however, neither of these two young, non-mainstream ?elds proved as constituted at a fundamental level as yet. Rather, ecological economics, founded at the end of the 1980s as an attempt to combine social and natural s- ence approaches(in particular economics and ecology) to study especially long-run environmental problems in an encompassing manner, has mainly developed into an interdisciplinary research forum on environmental-economicissues. Particularly uni?edbycertainnormativestanc s sharedwithinits community,it constitutes,well understood, a new discpline of its own right, distinct from economics, with its own scienti?c standards, questions, methodologies and institutions (Baumgartner ¨ and Becker 2005). Modern evolutionaryeconomicson the other hand has been a quarter of a century after its inception with Nelson and Winter (1982) still a mainly h- erogeneousendeavor, linked by a (rather amorphous) common interest in economic 'evolution' and a critical stance towards neoclassical mainstream economics, with a certain strength in applied studies on industrial dynamics (Heinzel 2004, 2006).
Preface7
Contents9
Acronyms13
Chapter 1 Introduction17
1.1 Motivation and Research Question17
1.2 Analytical Approach18
1.3 Main Contribution19
1.4 Outline21
Part I Theoretical Analysis23
Chapter 2 Foundations of the Theoretical Analysis24
2.1 Social versus Private Time Preferences24
2.1.1 The Economic Discounting Debate: First-best Benchmark, Second-best Cases, and Some More Recent Issues25
2.1.2 Three Reasons Particularly Relevant for the Present Analysis31
2.1.3 Summary and Treatment of the Assumption in the Model42
2.2 Time-Lagged Capital Theory44
2.2.1 Its Evolution and the Basic Neo-Austrian Three-process Model45
2.2.2 New Extensions47
2.3 Analytical Structure of the Model in Chapter 347
2.4 Conclusion48
Chapter 3 A Theoretical Model of Structural Change in the Energy Industry49
3.1 Model49
3.2 Social Optimum52
3.2.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Social Optimum52
3.2.2 Conditions for Investment and Replacement55
3.3 Unregulated Competitive Market Equilibrium59
3.3.1 The Household s Market Decisions59
3.3.2 The Firms Market Decisions60
3.3.3 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Unregulated Market Equilibrium61
3.3.4 Conditions for Investment and Replacement62
3.4 Competitive Market Equilibrium with Emission Tax and Investment Subsidy65
3.4.1 The Household s and Firms Market Decisions under Regulation65
3.4.2 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Regulated Market Equilibrium66
3.4.3 Conditions for Investment and Replacement68
3.5 Conclusion72
Chapter 4 Summary of Results, Discussion of Assumptions, and Policy Implications73
4.1 Summary of Results73
4.1.1 Too Low Unit Costs of Energy of Established Technology as Compared to Social Optimum Due to Pollution73
4.1.2 Too High Unit Costs of Energy of New Technology as Compared to Social Optimum Because Private Time-Preference Rate Higher Than Socially Optimal74
4.1.3 Time Lag of Capital Accumulation Reinforces Distortion from Split of Social and Private Time-Preference Rates75
4.1.4 Distortions Imply in Mutually Reinforcing Way Less Favorable Circumstances for Innovation and Replacement75
4.1.5 Social Optimum May Be Implemented by Setting Appropriate Emission Tax and Investment Subsidy76
4.1.6 Environmental Policy Alone Biased Towards Gradual Change, Technology Policy Alone Independant of Environmental Effect76
4.2 Discussion of Model Assumptions77
4.2.1 Social Rate of Time Preference Below Private77
4.2.2 Time Lag in Capital Accumulation77
4.2.3 Focus on Linear-limitational, General Energy Technologies78
4.2.4 Labor Only Primary Input, Energy Homogeneous Output78
4.2.5 Emissions as Flow Pollutant79
4.2.6 Abstraction from Peculiarities of Economics of Power Systems79
4.3 Policy Implications79
4.3.1 New Reason for Technology Policy80
4.3.2 No Support of Subsidies for Specific Technologies80
4.3.3 Necessary Completion of Environmental by Technology Policy80
4.3.4 Environmental Policy Alone Favors Gradual Change81
4.3.5 Substantiation of Win-win Hypothesis of Environmental Regulation81
4.4 Conclusions to Theoretical Part81
Part II Applied Analysis83
Chapter 5 Foundations of the Applied Analysis84
5.1 Analytical Setting and Specifics of the Applied Investigation84
5.1.1 Analytical Setting85
5.1.2 Focus on Germany Around 2015 and Conventional Generation Technologies86
5.1.3 Previous Literature, Contribution, and Data Sources87
5.1.4 Relationship to Theoretical Part90
5.2 Financial Model91
5.2.1 Capital Costs91
5.2.2 Costs During Operation93
5.2.