Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region
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Joseph Kostiner
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Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region
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VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (GWV)
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9783531913377
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1
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CHF 47.40
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Politikwissenschaft
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English
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274
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Wasserzeichen/DRM
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PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
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PDF
This book analyzes four main episodes of conflict and defense which have affected the region during the last three decades: the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), which effected the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) from a close, neighborly distance; the Iraq-Kuwait war (1990-1991), which constituted an attempt to invade the GCC and eliminate one of its member states, Kuwait. And the subsequent attempts to reestahblish a regional inter-state stability in the Gulf (during the mid-1990s, approximately), and the war of Islamic terrorism (notably al-Qa'ida) against Saudi Arabia (leading up to 2005). Each episode was driven by inimical interests and evolved as a distabilizintg influence on the Gulf states. At the same time, each conflict resulted in a paradoxical combination rivalry and cooperation among the GCC states themselves. A perpetual sequence of conflict and cooperation thus developed.
Joseph Kostiner, Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and Associate Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University.
Part Two: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict
(p. 78-79)
1 Iraq’s Passage to War
The reasons for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 can be explained by several factors. This chapter will address the links between the immediate factors that caused Iraq’s invasion, and the historical forces that were underlying the developing threat during 1990-1991. Specifically, the chapter will trace (a) Iraq’s passage to war and the issues that surrounded Saddam’s surprising invasion of Kuwait, (b) Kuwait’s historical relations with Iraq and its dealings with Saddam’s regime prior to the invasion, (c) the failure of Arab mediation during the diplomatic build-up prior to Iraq’s invasion, (d) the salient characteristics of the war, (e) the international community’s effort to develop a consensus and enforce a post-war accord with Iraq, and (f) developments in the Gulf community’s security environment in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 war.
The common denominator underlying the several factors that led to Iraq’s invasion was Iraq’s need for cash to fund its state-building after the end of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1988. Iraq was beset by economic difficulties typical of a post-war period: it owed about 45 billion dollars to Saudi Arabia, $15 billion to Kuwait, and another $10 billion to international banks. Iraq began releasing some tens of thousands of its circa 400,000 soldiers, which resulted in large numbers of young men in the marketplace and few jobs for them. Unemployment became a big problem. Furthermore, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that there were about a million Egyptian workers that had taken the place of Iraqis while the Iraqis had been recruited to fight the Iran-Iraq War, and now the Egyptians had to be dismissed back to Egypt, causing friction between the two Arab communities.
Iraq was also seeking to lower the oil production of oil exporting states, most of whom had been neighboring Gulf states. Iraq believed that by enacting a low oil production, it would enable a major increase in its own oil production rate and create more reasonable prices, which had been relatively low at around $20 to $25 per barrel. However, the Gulf states which had their own interests were reluctant to lower their own oil production and were interested in selling as much oil as possible for the highest possible price (Kuwait was permitted by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, OPEC, to produce 2.03 million barrels per day). Moreover, Iraq accused Kuwait of pumping oil from underneath the Rumayla oilfield, which belonged to Iraq.
Iraq’s goals can also be understood in strategic terms, and related to its position as a major actor in the region. Iraq ended the Iran-Iraq War without any direct access to the Gulf waters, while its opponent, Iran, controlled the entire Eastern shore of the Gulf. Iraq’s nearest port to Gulf waters was Umm-Qasr, which is located on the Shatt al-Arab waterway south of the Gulf waters. Baghdad was therefore looking for a site that could become an Iraqi port in the Gulf waters.
Preface
5
Contents
6
List of Boxes
10
About the Author
11
Acknowledgments
12
Introduction
13
Part One: The Iran-Iraq War
22
Part Two: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict
76
Part Three: Between the Gulf Wars: Restrained Conflict
139
Part Four: Al–Qa’ida’s Challenge: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War Against Terrorism, 1992 – 2005
199
Part Five: Conclusion
242
Appendices
249
Bibliography
276
